Utah County v. George S. Alexanderson and Charles H. Martin : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2002
Utah County v. George S. Alexanderson and
Charles H. Martin : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
M. Cort Griffin; Attorney for Appellee.
Todd M. Shaughnessy; Tawni J. Sherman; Snell & Wilmer; Attorneys for Appellants.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah County v. Alexanderson, No. 20020143 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3708
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH COUNTY, 
Petitioner/Appellee 
vs. 
GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON and 
CHARLES H. MARTIN, 
Respondents/Appellants. 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20020143-CA 
District Court Case No. 970400590 AA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON and 
CHARLES H. MARTIN 
M. Cort Griffin (4583) 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2400 
Provo,Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 370-8001 
Facsimile: (801) 370-8009 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Utah County 
Todd M. Shaughnessy (6651) 
Tawni J. Sherman (8133) 
Snell & Wilmer L L.P 
Gateway Tower West 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 257-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 257-1800 
Attorneys for Appellants George 
Alexanderson and Charles Martin 
/•**•»•, 
'^a/s 
w
 ^ourt 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH COUNTY, 
Petitioner/Appellee 
vs. 
GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON and 
CHARLES H. MARTIN, 
Respondents/Appellants. 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20020143-CA 
District Court Case No. 970400590 AA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON and 
CHARLES H. MARTIN 
Todd M. Shaughnessy (6651) 
Tawni J. Sherman (8133) 
Snell & Wilmer L L.P. 
Gateway Tower West 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 257-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 257-1800 
Attorneys for Appellants George 
Alexanderson and Charles Martin 
M. Cort Griffin (4583) 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2400 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 370-8001 
Facsimile: (801) 370-8009 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Utah County 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 1 
ARGUMENT 2 
1. The County has not shown that the Council's determination was subject 
to a "garden variety" abuse of discretion standard of review 4 
2. The three month rule is not jurisdictional 10 
3. The Council's timeliness determination was neither clearly erroneous nor 
a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion 13 
4. The County has failed to show that application of the discovery rule 
was not warranted under these facts 14 
CONCLUSION 15 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Spears v. Reynolds. 2002 UT 24 3, 5 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 5, 6 
Macris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43, f 14, 24 P.3d 984 6 
Renn v. Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 667 (Utah 1995) 6, 7, 8, 9 
State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 6, 7, 8, 9 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 6 
Dean v. Henriod. 1999 UT App 056, 975 P.2d 946 8, 9 
Indian Village Trading Post, Inc. v. Bench. 929 P.2d 367 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 8 
Brendle v. City of Draper. 937 P.2d 1044 (Utah Ct. App. 1997 12, 13 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (UtahCt. App. 1991).. . .14 
Sevy v. Security Title, Inc., 902 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995) 15 
SHERMAT\SLC\237101 
S L M M A R Y O F T H E ARl . i > h '* i 
l l ie Utah Countv Sheriffs Office n!;> )••; -r r. } vvas engaged in widespread, 
systematic violations ui sie. • : ' rinciples it was legally obligated to appl 
making prom> • * --oris and, because of these irreguianue,;,, ,.\ K.:r :> - were not 
advanced to the rank of Sergeant. Although :.^ . * . -~ -iv *:--' passed over for 
promotion in 1991, they v: 1 *t ; e- nu Had nu way to discover the faulty reasoning 
the Department. . > -kuvjy those decisions until Decern;.;.; : -v- " :me, the 
! ]^\ . .-- 'earned for the first time two critical things: First, that their promotions had ' 
been consistently denied based on the Sheriffs incorrect assumption that the position of 
Shift Supervise ; A ^ • neld was not a ranked position, somen.., J • \ <[>-"\:i 
a-n- '••'• -: • r ^ later testimony before the i «iaii i .. ..••;•" '---»vice Council 
("Council"). Second, the Deputies le;ir. • • •: vxviiic mcideni in which a high 
ranking member ot the IUIII must ration had attempted to manipulate a men/ *• 
I lie* i >tin-.iI, -iMcr hearing evidence and argument ni, , .
 : • ,,, !••-.-. • :he Deputies* 
grievance, on three separate occasions, ami alter \r\ iew ini* in detail each and e\'ery 
promotion process ai;d ••• niade bv the Department between i' 
ue»n. • • \i ;l ~ '!-e Deputies did not learn ol then eur ; . . • *• • *••. her 199u. IL^ 
Council therefore concluded ii-.-.u .;.. , -
 { .u:= v h • ! !' ied their grievance within the time 
allowed under tik -,-. • ' • 
T ••, f *";!ed :\ petition with the District Court seeMii- , - J rhe Council's 
decision under Rule 65 B of the Utah h ^ e , <». • : - .lure. In January 2002, after 
1 
lengthy and convoluted proceedings, the district court affirmed the Council's 
determination that the Department's testing procedures were inconsistent, biased, and 
violative of merit principles. The Court, however, concluded as a matter of law that the 
Deputies' grievance was untimely because it was not filed within three months of the 
Deputies being passed over for promotion in 1991. 
The Council's factual determination that the Deputies did not leam of their cause 
of action until December 1996 should have been afforded great deference because the 
Council sat in a privileged position as fact finder. In addition, even to the extent 
questions of law are involved, the district court should have given an extra measure of 
deference to the Council because this case was brought under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Because the record supports the Council's first decision and the 
district court's reversal was erroneous, the Council's June 30, 1997 decision should be 
affirmed and the district court's January 2, 2002 Order Granting Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
In spite of the Council's repeated determination that the Deputies' grievance was 
timely filed, the district court concluded, as a matter of law, that the Deputies' grievance 
was not timely. In their opening brief, the Deputies made three main arguments in 
support of their contention that the district court's January 2002 order should be reversed: 
First, the district court should not have reviewed the Council's timeliness 
determination as a pure question of law, but should instead have given considerable 
deference to the Council's finding of fact that the Deputies did not know of their injury 
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until they uncovered evidence of administrative corruption involving at least one 
promotional test, which led to their December 1996 meeting with Sheriff Bateman, which 
led, in turn, to their uncovering the Department's clear pattern and practice of violating 
merit principles in each and every promotional process from 1991 to 1996. Because the 
district court did not afford the Council's timeliness determination any deference, the 
district court should be reversed and the Council's original timeliness determination 
reinstated. Second, because the Council's timeliness determination is supported by the 
record, it should have been allowed to stand. Third, even assuming that the proper 
standard of review is de novo, for correctness, and even to the extent questions of law 
may be involved, the Council's timeliness determination should still be affirmed. Under 
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the lower tribunal's ruling should be 
given an extra measure of deference, even when the decision involves an issue of law. 
Thus, the Council's determination should have been reversed only if it amounted to a 
gross and flagrant abuse of discretion. 
In response, the County argued that the Council's decision should be reviewed for 
abuse of discretion, as that term is routinely applied in cases not brought under Rule 
65B—a standard this Court has referred to as "garden variety" abuse of discretion review. 
(Br. Aplee. at 11-14) The County also agreed with the Deputies' assertion that review of 
a statute of limitations issue is a legal question, which involves a "'subsidiary factual 
determination"' that should be reversed only for clear error. (Aplee. Br. at 14 (quoting 
Spears v. Reynolds, 2002 UT 24, Tf32).) The County also advanced the argument, one 
that had been rejected by the Council on at least three occasions, that because the 
• 3 • ' . ' 
Deputies did not file a grievance within three months of the initial adverse promotion 
decision, the grievance should be time-barred. Finally, the County argued that the 
Council's finding that the Deputies' discovery of relevant facts was the trigger date for 
the three-month rule was clearly erroneous, and that the Deputies cannot rely on either 
the discovery rule or equitable estoppel. 
None of the arguments advanced by the County warrants affirming the district 
court's January 2002 order. The issue posed by this case is not, as the County suggests, 
whether "the Deputies fail[ed] to timely file their grievance with the . . . Council within 
three months from the date of the occurrence . . . ." (Br. Aplee. at 1) The Deputies have 
never contended that they filed within three months of the December 1991 denial of 
promotion. Moreover, that question was considered by the finder of fact—the Council— 
and its determination was reaffirmed on several occasions. (Br. Aplt. at 12-17) Instead, 
the issue before this Court is what standard of review should be applied to the Council's 
determination. As discussed in the Deputies' opening brief, the district court should have 
afforded considerable deference to the Council's finding of fact regarding the trigger date 
for the three-month rule. Because the district court incorrectly reviewed the Council's 
decision as a matter of law, affording no deference to its findings of fact, the district court 
should be reversed and the Council's initial determination upheld. 
1. The County has not shown that the Council's determination was 
subject to a "garden variety" abuse of discretion standard of review. 
The core issue in this case is whether the district court applied the proper standard 
of review to the Council's determination that the Deputies' grievance was timely. The 
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Council's determination is analogous to a statute of limitations analysis, and thus should 
be reviewed as a mixed question of fact and law, with considerable deference afforded to 
the Council's subsidiary findings of fact. In addition, because this case involves a 
petition brought under Rule 65, even to the extent questions of law are involved—and to 
the degree a statute of limitations-type analysis involves the resolution of legal issues— 
the Council's determination should be disturbed only if it was a gross and flagrant abuse 
of discretion.1 
In its response brief, the County concedes that in the analogous area of statute of 
limitations analysis, the proper standard of review is as a mixed question of fact and law. 
(Br. Aplee. at 14-15.) The case of Spears v. Reynolds, cited by the County, 
acknowledges precisely the two-part standard of review argued by the Deputies in their 
opening brief: "The applicability of a statute of limitations and the applicability of the 
discovery rule are questions of law which [are] review[ed] for correctness. . . . However, 
the applicability of [these rules] also involves a subsidiary factual determination^ which 
presents] a question of fact." Spears v. Reynolds, 2002 UT 24 at [^32. Thus, there 
appears to be no dispute that the Department's internal three-month rule should be 
reviewed as a mixed question of fact and law. As a result, the Council's determination 
that the Deputies5 grievance was timely filed should be reversed "only if the ruling 
'contradicts the great weight of evidence or if [the] court reviewing the evidence is left 
1
 As a technical matter, this Court reviews the Council's decision directly and affords no 
deference to the district court's ruling. Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 
23, 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The deputies submit that had the district court applied the 
proper standard, as this Court now must do, the Council's decision would have been 
upheld and the County's petition denied. 
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with a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'"" Maoris v. 
Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43, f 14, 24 P.3d 984 (citations omitted). It is 
undisputed that the district court did not apply this standard in reversing the Council. 
In spite of this concession that a mixed standard of review is appropriate, the 
County tries to minimize the deference owed the Council's timeliness determination by 
contending that because the County brought the case as a Rule 65B(d) petition for 
extraordinary relief, overall review should be under the traditional, garden-variety abuse 
of discretion standard.2 (Br. Aplee. at 11-14) 
The County also incorrectly asserts that our appellate courts have "only applied 
the gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard when an appeal is statutorily 
prohibited," and relies on the cases of Renn v. Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 667 (Utah 
1995), and State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), in support of this 
proposition. (Br. Aplee. at 13) However, the "gross and flagrant" standard articulated in 
Renn and Stirba is not so limited. 
It is true that both the Renn and Stirba courts expressed their concerns that 
impermissible appeals should not be allowed. See Renn, 904 P.2d at 683; Stirba, 972 
P.2d at 920. Under the facts of those cases, such concern was appropriate. However, that 
2
 The County's citation to the Tolman discussion of abuse of discretion adds little to its 
argument. (Br. Aplee. at 13-14.) First, the Tolman case was decided well before Renn 
and Stirba. See Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). Second, and more importantly, Tolman's discussion of the abuse of discretion 
standard was a general effort to clear up some imprecision in the terms used to discuss 
standards of review. Tolman's statements regarding the abuse of discretion standard 
must be seen in context, as part of a continuing evolution of standards of review in Utah 
that led to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 
and subsequent decisions applying those standards. 
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element was not dispositive in either case. Stirba involved a challenge to the district 
court's denial of the crime victims' request for restitution. See Stirba, 972 P.2d at 920. 
In its discussion of the victims' Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) petition—the section under which the 
County's petition for extraordinary writ was brought—the court applied the "gross and 
flagrant" standard first articulated in Renn. In so doing, however, the court did not limit 
its standard-of-review discussion solely to situations in which the petitioner sought to 
bring a statutorily-prohibited appeal. Instead, the court simply stated that '"abuse of 
discretion' for Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writs must be much more blatant than the garden 
variety 'abuse of discretion' featured in routine appellate review." Id. at 922. 
The Stirba court concluded that the district court had incorrectly interpreted the 
law as expressed in the governing restitution statute. Nonetheless, the court concluded 
that the incorrect conclusion did not warrant reversal because "a simple mistake of the 
law does not qualify as the kind of gross and flagrant abuse of discretion necessary for a 
Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ to issue." Id. at 923. The court's eventual conclusion that the 
district court's error of law was not "blatant" enough for the writ to issue was based on 
two separate and independent factors: first, the heightened deference given to the lower 
tribunal's exercise of discretion; and second, the court's concern about not allowing a 
party to pursue a statutorily-prohibited appeal. 
That these are two separate, independent concerns is made clear in the conclusion, 
wherein the court stated that it was denying the petition "[b]ased on our determination 
that Judge Stirba neither failed to perform a legally-required act under Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) 
nor abused her discretion under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A), coupled with our holding that the 
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State's action is tantamount to an impermissible appeal[.]" Id. (Emphasis added.) In 
other words, whether the district court committed a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion 
was an independent determination, and was not based solely on the fact that the 
petitioners' appeals were not authorized by statute. Renn and Stirba are simply not as 
limited as the County suggests. 
Moreover, contrary to the County's assertion that Renn and Stirba are the only two 
cases employing the "gross and flagrant" abuse of discretion standard, that standard has 
been applied in at least two other cases, neither of which involved an appellant's seeking 
to circumvent a statutory bar to appeal, SQQ Dean v. Henriod, 1999 UT App 056, 975 
P.2d 946; Indian Village Trading Post, Inc. v. Bench, 929 P.2d 367 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
In Dean, the petitioner appealed a Salt Lake County Justice Court conviction. See Dean, 
1999 UT App 056 at f 1. The district court then scheduled a pretrial conference, and the 
petitioner twice failed to appear. In seeking an extraordinary writ, the petitioner sought 
to compel the district court to reinstate his appeal of the justice court's conviction. On 
review, this Court concluded the district court's remand was improper, and cited Stirba's 
statement that, for purposes of a Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ, "'"[a]buse of discretion'" . . . 
must be much more blatant than the garden variety 'abuse of discretion' featured in 
routine appellate review.'" IcL at |13 . 
In the Indian Village case, a fire marshal had "redtagged" the petitioner's property, 
thereby prohibiting the petitioner from occupying the buildings on the redtagged 
property. See Indian Village, 929 P.2d at 368. The petitioner sought extraordinary relief 
under Rule 65, and the district court ultimately concluded that the fire marshal had not 
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abused his discretion in redtagging the property. On appeal, the court of appeals applied 
the same standard articulated in Renn, Stirba, and Dean, noting that historically 
mandamus (upon which the Rule 65B extraordinary writ is based) was meant to address 
"situations where officials have acted, but have greatly exceeded the scope of their lawful 
discretion." Id. at 370 (emphasis added). The same highly deferential standard applies 
to petitions brought under Rule 65B(e), under which "a petitioner may seek . . . to compel 
correction of a public officer's gross abuse of discretion." Id. (emphasis added.) 
In sum, the County has failed to show that the Council's decision should be 
reviewed under a "garden-variety" abuse of discretion standard, or that such a result is 
compelled by our appellate courts' previous statements of the proper standard of review 
to be applied to a petition for extraordinary relief brought under Rule 65B. Instead, as 
argued by the Deputies in their opening brief, the Council's determination is properly 
reviewed as a mixed question of fact and law, affording considerable deference to the 
Council's subsidiary findings of fact. In the alternative, and to the extent legal questions 
are involved, the Council's determination should still be afforded considerable deference 
under Rule 65B and should be reversed only for a "gross and flagrant" abuse of 
discretion, under which standard a "simple mistake of law" is not enough to warrant 
reversal. See Stirba, 972 P.2d at 923. 
The district court did not apply either of these standards, and even the County 
acknowledges that the correctness standard does not apply. Therefore, the Deputies 
respectfully request that this Court reverse the district court's January 2002 ruling, 
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thereby reinstating the Council's determination that the Deputies' grievance was timely 
filed. 
2. The three-month rule is not jurisdictional. 
The County contends that the three-month filing rule found in the County's policy 
and procedures manual is jurisdictional, and that because the Deputies did not file their 
grievance within three months of the December 1991 decision not to promote them, the 
grievance is flatly barred. In essence, the County is arguing that the Deputies missed a 
statute of limitations—to which the three month rale is analogous, but not identical—and 
therefore have irredeemably lost their cause of action. This argument fails for at least 
two reasons. 
First, the Deputies have never pretended that their grievance was filed within three 
months of the December 1991 promotion decision. They knew that they were not 
promoted in December 1991, but did not know the reasons why they were not promoted. 
More specifically, the Deputies did not know until December 1996 that at least one 
attempt was made by a high-ranking Department administrator to unlawfully influence 
the testing process, or that the Sheriff had continually made promotion decisions based on 
his admittedly erroneous assumption that the Deputies' positions as Shift Supervisors, a 
Corporal rank, were unot a ranked position in the Department." (R. 341, 368) This 
wrongful assumption deprived the Deputies of due consideration as ranked officers most 
competent for promotion to Sergeant during every promotion cycle between 1991 and 
1996. In addition, the Deputies' informal complaints to their supervisors after they were 
effectively demoted to the lower rank of deputy were responded to with repeated 
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assurances that their concerns would be addressed internally, that they were eligible to 
and should continue to participate in the promotion process, and that they ultimately 
would be promoted to the rank of Sergeant. (R. 374) 
It was also not until December 1996 that the Deputies confirmed that other 
individuals who did not meet the job-related minimum qualifications had been promoted 
in their place, in spite of being ineligible for promotion under the Department's own 
policies, while the Deputies were fully-qualified under those same policies. (R. 373) 
The Deputies also learned that the Department had failed to conduct legitimate merit-
based testing, had failed to establish correct eligibility lists or appointment registers, and 
had failed to make eligibility lists and appointment registers available for inspection by 
applicants. (R. 374) The Council carefully reviewed each and every promotional process 
used by the Department since 1991 and found that each was fundamentally flawed—the 
Council concluded that the "promotions have been based on arbitrary criteria. The 
current testing procedures appear inconsistent, biased and capricious." (R. 347-48). 
Moreover, during these years the Deputies continued to test for promotions in 
good faith, based on their fully-qualified status and repeated assurances by Department 
management that they would be treated fairly as a result of the "reclassification" of the 
Shift Supervisor position. The Deputies were urged to continue to apply for promotions 
within the Department under considerable institutional pressure to rely on their 
supervisors' encouraging statements, and conform with the Department's chain-of-
command organizational structure, even though the promotion and eligibility 
requirements fluctuated widely. Ultimately, after December 1996, the Deputies learned 
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that the promotion and eligibility requirements had been consistently disregarded by both 
the Department and the County Personnel Office. (R. 370) 
Under these facts, the Council determined and repeatedly affirmed that the 
Deputies did not discover, nor could they have discovered, the existence of their cause of 
action until December 1996. Thus, this case is analogous to one in which a statute of 
limitation is deemed not to have begun to run until the cause of action is discovered. 
Second, unlike the 14-day rule set forth in a Draper City ordinance at issue in 
Brendlev. City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the sole case relied on by 
the County in support of this argument, the three-month rule here is merely a creature of 
the county's internal personnel rules, set out in a policy and procedures manual. The 
three-month rule was not established by the legislature, or even by county ordinance. 
The legislature has established a detailed set of statutes, the County Personnel 
Management Act, to promote and regulate a merit system of personnel administration by 
the counties. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-33-1 to -15. The legislature did not, however, 
establish a time limit for filing grievances, even though it has established such limits in 
the related area of appeals to Civil Service Commissions. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
1012(2). By not fixing a time limit within which an employee must file a grievance, the 
legislature implicitly left the Council's "jurisdiction" in this regard open and subject to 
whatever limit the Council deemed appropriate. Just as the Council had discretion to 
establish the three-month time limit, so should it have had discretion to decide when, in 
the interests of fairness, and consistent with its statutory mandate to be "in sympathy with 
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application of merit principles to public employment," Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4, the 
three-month time period should be deemed to have begun to rim.3 
Interestingly, the Council itself fully understood the scope of its jurisdiction. In 
its decision letter, the Council declined to award the Deputies their costs and attorneys 
fees, stating "[t]he Council is unable to make a ruling on the attorneys fees and costs 
because it is outside the scope of our authority." (R. 349) The Council clearly 
understood the scope of its jurisdiction and acted well within it in deciding to hear the 
Deputies' grievance and ultimately in granting the Deputies the majority of their 
requested relief. 
3. The Council's timeliness determination was neither clearly erroneous 
nor a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion. 
The County contends that the record does not support a finding that the Deputies 
did not know of the serious irregularities in the Department's promotion process until 
after their December 1996 conversation with Sheriff Bateman. In addition, the County 
contends that the only relevant consideration is when the Deputies knew that they were 
3
 Brendle is also distinguishable because it is grounded on an ordinance fixing a time 
within which to appeal a zoning decision. Zoning is unusually dependent on the need for 
various deadlines to be strictly observed while one is working through the process of 
gaining approval. In this process, a party must step through successive levels of seeking 
authority in order to advance to the next stage of the process, and all other parties 
involved (including the public) must be able to rely on compliance with one step before 
advancing to the next. Here, it is understandable why the failure to meet such a deadline 
would be grounds for disregarding a claim. In contrast, the three month rule at issue in 
this case is more akin to a statute of limitations governing the filing of a complaint for 
negligence; it does not present the same multi-layered, complex set of deadlines and 
procedures posed by the zoning process, nor is there the need for public certainty. 
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not promoted and that other deputies not meeting minimum requirements were promoted. 
In this regard, the County is re-arguing the facts. As discussed in section 2 above and in 
the Deputies' opening brief, the Deputies have never disputed that they knew in 1991 that 
they had not been promoted. Instead, the reasons why the ranked Deputies had not been 
logically promoted to the next rank were unknown to them until December 1996 since 
there was no merit testing process in 1991 to explain the promotion rationale. Moreover, 
the Deputies would have no way of knowing the qualifications of those promoted above 
them. This knowledge was critical to their ability to know they had a cause of action 
upon which a grievance could be made. 
As the County's lengthy marshaling effort shows, there is sufficient record 
evidence to support the Council's finding that the Deputies' grievance was timely filed. 
(Br. Aplee. at 21-26.) There simply has not been a showing that the Council's timeliness 
determination was "'so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight of the 
evidence."'" West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
4. The County has failed to show that application of the discovery rule 
was not warranted under these facts. 
Finally, the County argues that the discovery rule should not apply to the facts of 
this case. The County's effort on appeal to re-argue the facts highlights precisely why 
our appellate courts grant such considerable deference to the lower tribunal's findings of 
fact, and their interpretation of their own internal rules, overturning them only if there is 
no support in the record for the finding. The Council found that the Deputies' grievance 
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was timely. (Br. Aplt. at 12-17) If the correct standard of review is applied to the 
Council's determination, this timeliness finding should be allowed to stand. 
In addition, the County argues that the exceptional circumstances prong of the 
discovery rule cannot apply to this case, because under the balancing test articulated in 
Sew v. Security Title, Inc., 902 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995), the hardship to the County 
outweighs any hardship to the Deputies. The County relies primarily on the fact that, due 
to the passage of time, "the claim has aged to the point that witnesses cannot be located, 
evidence cannot be found, and the parties cannot remember basic events." Id at 636. In 
this regard, it is important to note that any delay in this case has been caused not by the 
Deputies, but by the Department's continued concealment of the reasons for the 
inconsistencies in its promotion process, its failure to conduct open and fair testing, its 
refusal to publish eligibility lists and other basic information required by statute to be 
published, its failure to explain to the Deputies the reasons why they were denied 
promotion, and its repeated assurance that the Department would make things right. The 
Deputies could not have known at any point between December 1991 and December 
1996 that they had been denied promotion based on the Sheriffs erroneous assumption 
that Shift Supervisor was not a ranked position within the Department. (Br. Aplt. at 14-
15.) Once they learned this, they acted promptly in asserting their claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The Council's determination that the Deputies' grievance was timely filed, and 
that the three-month rule began to run in December 1996 when the Deputies learned the 
facts necessary to create their cause of action, should have been reviewed by the district 
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court as a mixed question of fact and law, with considerable deference afforded the 
Council's subsidiary findings of fact. And because the district court's review was 
pursuant to Rule 65B(d)(2)(A), the Council's determination should have been reversed 
only for a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion. Under this highly deferential standard, 
the Council's timeliness determination should have been allowed to stand. 
Because the district court improperly reviewed the Council's determination for 
correctness, affording no deference to the Council's superior ability to implement 
personnel rules and evaluate the credibility of the evidence presented to it on three 
separate occasions, this Court should reverse the district court's order granting the 
County's Petition for Extraordinary Writ. Such a reversal would, in effect, reinstate the 
Council's determination that the Deputies filed timely. 
Such a reversal would also serve the interests of justice. If there is any doubt 
regarding the timeliness of the Deputies' filing, equity and the interests of justice demand 
that the doubt be resolved in favor of the Deputies' case being resolved on the merits, 
rather than by a procedural ruling based on an erroneous application of the law. The fact 
that the Deputies were wronged by the Department's continued pattern and practice of 
inconsistent, biased, and capricious promotional testing and its failure to comply with 
merit principles was recognized repeatedly by the Council and the district court, and it 
has not been challenged on appeal. The Deputies took considerable risk in challenging 
the Department and believe that if the Department is not sent a clear message that it must 
comply with merit principles, it may continue to disregard them. 
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